Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs (2007– )
2015

Cesar Daniel Lopez, Petitioner/ Appellant, vs. Ogden City,
Defendants/ Appellee.
Utah Court of Appeals

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca3
Part of the Law Commons

Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Lopez v Ogden City, No. 20150271 (Utah Court of Appeals, 2015).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca3/3712

This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of Appeals Briefs (2007– ) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital
Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/
utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

CESAR DANIEL LOPEZ,
Petitioner/Appellant,
vs.

OGDEN CITY,
Appellate Court No. 20150271
Defendants/Appellee.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

FILED
URTS
LATE CO
UTAH APPEL

JUL 2 3 20\5

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

CESAR DANIEL LOPEZ,
Petitioner/Appellant,
VS.

OGDEN CITY,
Appellate Court No. 20150271
Defendants/Appellee.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

Jason B. Richards,# 13341
RICHARDS LAW GROUP, P.C.
Attorneys for Cesar Daniel Lopez

fr{)

Michael S. Junk,# 5095
\Vm. Gregory Burdett, # 7825
OGDEN CITY PROSECUTOR'S
OFFICE
Attorneys for Ogden City

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

TABLE OF CONTENTS
TABLE OF AUTHORJTIES ........................................................................ 3
CASELA\V ............................................................................................ 3
STATUTES ............................................................................................ 4
COURT RlTLES ...................................................................................... 4
JURISDICTIONAL STATEl\1ENT AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS ................. .4
STATEMENT OF ISSUES ON APPEAL ........................................................ .4
STANDARD OF REVIE\V .......................................................................... 5
PRESERVATION .................................................................................... 6
STATEMENT OF THE CASE ...................................................................... 6
STATEMENT OF FACTS .......................................................................... 7
SU1WARY OF ARG"(Jj\lfENT .................................................................... 10
ARGUNIENT ...
I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED \VHEN IT DISMISSED CESAR'S CLAIM FOR
POST CONVICTION RELIEF ON THE GROUND THAT THE CESAR FILED
HIS CLAIMS AFTER THE EXPERIATION OF THE LIMITATIONS PERIOD
AS SET FORTH IN UTAH CODE ANN§ 78B-9-107(1) BECAUSE BEING
PRESENTED ANY EVIDENCE OF WHETHER THE TOLLING PROVISIONS
APPLY IN UTAH CODE ANN.§ 78B-9-107(2)(e) or§ 78B-9-107(3) ............ 11
II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED \VHEN IT DISMISSED PETITIONER'S CLAIN!
FOR POST CONVICTION RELIEF ON THE GROUND THAT THE CESAR
FILED HIS CLAIMS AFTER THE EXPERIATION OF THE LIMITATIONS
PERIOD AS SET FORTH IN UTAH CODE ANN§ 78B-9-107(1) BY REL YING
ON DOC"(Jj\lfENTS OUTSIDE THE MOTION ........................................ 17
CONCLUSION ....................................................................................... 20
CERTIFICATE OF CONIPLIANCE .............................................................. 22
PROOF OF SERVICE ............................................................................... 23
ADDENDlJM ......................................................................................... 24

2
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

~

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
CASE LAW
Peckv. State, 2008 UT 39,

,r 2 191 P.3d 4 (Utah 2008) ...................................... 5, 7

Hall v. Department of Corrections, 2001 UT 34,
Gardner v. State, 2010 UT 46,
ViP

~

2, 24 P.3d 958) ....................... .5, 7

fl 55,234 P.3d 1115 ............................................. 5

Taylor v. State, 2007 UT 12, P 13, 156 P.3d 739 (Utah 2007) ................................ 5
Gardner v. Galetka, 2004 UT 42, P 7, 94 P.3d 263 (Utah 2004) .............................. 5
1WcNair v. State, 2014 UT App 127,328 P.3d 874 (UT Ct. App. 2014) ......... 5, 11, 15, 16
Colman v. Utah State Land Bd., 795 P.2d 622, 624 (Utah 1990) ........................... 5, 12
438 1Wain St. v. Easy Heat, Inc., 2004 UT 72, tjj 51, 99 P.3d 801 (Utah 2004) ............... 5
Brookside 1Wobile Home Park, Ltd. v. Peebles, 2002 UT 48, 48 P.3d 968
(UT 2002) ............................................................................................. 5
Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356 (2010) ............................................. .4, 6, 9, 14
St. Benedict's Dev. Co. v. St. Benedict's Hosp., 811 P.2d 194 (Utah 1991) ............. 11, 13
Fong Yue Tingv. United States, 149 U.S. 698, (1893) ........................................ 14

vd)

INSv. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032 (1984) .................................................. 14
United States v. Russell, 686 F.2d 35, 38, (CADC 1982) ...................................... 14
Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52 (1985) ............................................................. 14
Delgadillo v. Carmichael, 332 U.S. 388 (1947) ............................................... .14
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, (1984) ................................................ 15
Tuttle v. Olds, 2007 UT App 10, P6, 155 P.3d 893, (Utah Ct. App. 2007) ................. 17

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Oakwood Vil!., L.L.C. v. Albertsons,, 2004 UT 101, Pl 2, 104 P.3d 1226
(Utah 2004) .................................................................................... . 17, 19

Hebertson v. Willmvcreek Plaza, 923 P.2d 1389, 1391 (Utah 1996) ......................... 18
Strand v. Associated Students of Univ. of Utah, 561 P.2d 191, 193 (Utah 1977) .......... .18
STATUTES
Utah Code Ann. § 78B-9-107 ........................................................... .4, 8, 11, 12, 13
Utah Code Ann.§ 78B-9-104 ........................................................................... 5
COURT RULES
Utah R.
Utah R.
Utah R.
Utah R.

Civ. P. Rule 12(b)(6) ................................................................. 3, 11, 18
Civ. P. Rule 65C .............................................................................. 15
Civ. P. Rt1le 56(.f) ........................................................................... 19
Crim. P. Rt1le 11 ............................................................................... 8

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This is an appeal from a final order and judgment entered by the Honorable Ernie
\V. Jones on March 9, 2015. This order dismissed Appellanf s petition filed under the

Post Conviction Remedies Act, after a motion to dismiss was filed by Ogden City, the
Appellee in this case. This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78A-4l 03 and Rule 65C(q) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES ON APPEAL
POINT I
DID THE TRIAL COURT ERR V/HEN IT GRANTED OGDEN CITY'S MOTION TO
DISMISS CESAR'S CLAIM FOR POST CONVICTION RELIEF ON THE GROUND
THAT CESAR FILED HIS CLAIMS AFTER THE EXPERIATION OF THE
LIMITATIONS PERIOD AS SET FORTH IN UTAH CODE ANN§ 78B-9-107(1)
WITHOUT BEING PRESENTED ANY EVIDENCE OF 'WHETHER THE TOLLING
PROVISIONS APPLY IN UTAH CODE ANN.§ 78B-9-107(2)(e) or§ 78B-9-107(3)?
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POINT II
DID THE TRIAL COURT CO1\1MIT REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT GRANTED
OGDEN CITY'S MOTION TO DIS:NIISS CESAR'S CLAIM FOR POST
CONVICTION RELIEF ON THE GROUND THAT THE CESAR FILED HIS CLAIMS
AFTER THE EXPERIATION OF THE LIMITATIONS PERIOD AS SET FORTH IN
UTAH CODE ANN§ 78B-9-107(1) BY REL YING ON DOCUMENTS OUTSIDE THE
PLEADINGS?

STANDARD OF REVIE\V
On appeal from a motion to dismiss, an appellate court ';revie\v(s) the facts only as
they are alleged in the complaint. The Court is to accept the factual allegations as true
and draw all reasonable inferences from those facts in a light most favorable to the
plaintiff." Peck v. State, 2008 UT 39, ,r 2 191 P.3d 4 (Utah 2008) (quoting Hall v.

Department of Corrections, 2001 UT 34,

~

2, 24 P.3d 958). Furthermore, an appellate

court revie\VS an ';appeal from an order dismissing or denying a petition for postconviction relief for correctness without deference to the lower court's conclusions of
la\v." Gardner v. State, 2010 UT 46,

~

55, 234 P.3d 1115, Taylor v. State, 2007 UT 12, P

13, 156 P.3d 739 (Utah 2007) (quoting Gardner v. Galetka, 2004 UT 42, P 7, 94 P.3d
263 (Utah 2004). When revie\ving a dismissal based on rule 12(b)(6) of the Utah Rules of
~

Civil Procedure, an appellate court must accept the material allegations in the petition as
tme, and we will affirm the dismissal only if the petitioner has failed to state a claim for
which relief can be granted, i.e., if he "can prove no set of facts in support of his claim."
See McNair v. State, 2014 UT App 127,

~

6, 328 P.3d 874, 877 (Utah Ct. App. 2014)

quoting Colman v. Utah State Land Bd., 795 P.2d 622, 624 (Utah 1990).

5
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PRESERVATION
These issues are preserved for appeal because they \Vere appropriately raised in the
trial court. "'[I]n order to preserve an issue for appeal[,] the issue must be presented to
the trial court in such a way that the trial court has an opportunity to rule on that issue."'
4381'lfain St. v. Easy Heat, Inc., 2004 UT 72,

fi 51, 99 P.3d 801

(Utah 2004) (alterations

in original) (quoting Brookside Nfobile Home Park, Ltd. v. Peebles, 2002 UT 48, -;j 14, 48
P.3d 968 (Utah 2002).
STATE1\1ENT OF THE CASE
This case involves a petition for relief pursuant to the Post Conviction Remedies
Act as outlined in U.C.A. § 78B-9-104 (the ;;Petition') filed by the Appellant, Cesar
Daniel Lopez. Cesar filed his the Petition on September 4, 2014 in the Ogden Second
District Court. (See the Petition attached herewith as ;~Addendum A''.) The petition raises
several challenges to Cesar's conviction of retail theft on January 28, 2011 in the Ogden
City Justice Court. Cesar alleged three primary issues in his Petition. First he alleged that
his conviction \Vas unconstitutional because he \Vas not afforded his rights as outlined in
Rule 11 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure. As a corollary, because he \Vas not
informed of certain constitutional rights, his guilty plea was not entered knowingly and
voluntarily. Second, Cesar alleged that he was not apprised of the effects this conviction
would have on his immigration status, in violation of his due process rights under the
U.S. Constitution, more fully outlined in Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356 (2010). Third,
Petitioner alleged that the aforementioned errors occurred because of ineffective
assistance of his trial counsel.
6
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The trial court issued a commencement order on 11/10/2014 ordering Ogden City
to respond to the Petition. Ogden City moved to dismiss the petition on 12/10/2014 under

(.Ji)

t\vo grounds: First that the petition \Vas procedurally barred for failing to seek a trial de
novo (i.e., an appeal) and second because the Petition was barred by the statute of
limitations. (See Ogden City's moving papers attached as Addendum B.) The trial court
granted Ogden City's motion to dismiss because it found that the Petition was barred by
the limitations period outlined by Utah Code Ann.§ 78B-9-107(2)(e). The Court
specifically relied upon ';docket entries'' produced as attachments to the City's motion to
dismiss to determine that Cesar ·;should have known of the facts (upon ,vhich his petition
was based) through the exercise of reasonable diligence." Specifically, the trial court
found that the ';official docket entries represent instances \Vhere the Petitioner- through
the exercise of diligent efforts- should have known of the potential impending
immigration concerns that could accompany his guilty plea." (See Order Dismissing Case
\@

on page 3, attached herewith as Addendum C). Essentially, the trial court relied upon
minute entry notes in the unverified docket pages attached Ogden City's motion to
determine that Cesar knevv", or should have known through the exercise of reasonable
diligence that there would be negative immigration consequences of his guilty plea.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
As mentioned supra, on appeal from a motion to dismiss, the appellate court
··review(s) the facts only as they are alleged in the complaint." Peck v. State, 2008 UT 39,
~

2. This court is to accept the factual allegations as true and draw all reasonable

inferences from those facts in a light most favorable to the plaintiff." Id. (quoting Hall v.
7
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Department of Corrections, 2001 UT 34,

~

2, 24 P.3d 958). The trial court did not hold

any hearings, evidentiary or othenvise, in this case. Therefore, the facts as outlined in the
petition for post conviction relief are as follows:
Cesar was convicted of Retail Theft, a Class B Misdemeanor on January 28, 2011
in the Ogden Justice Court in \Veber County (See Justice Court Case No. 101803862).
Cesar \Vas charged by way of Information on 11/20/2010. He was arrested and taken to
jail shortly after the alleged offense purportedly took place. Cesar was brought before the
justice court judge via video court the next morning. The public defender entered as
counsel and scheduled a pre-trial conference. On or about 12/02/2010 Cesar had a pretrial conference and \Vas transported from the jail to his court appearance. He was again
transported to the justice court for a pre-trial conference on 12/09/2010. On or about
01/29/2011 Cesar was transported to the jail fully intending on have a trial on his theft
charge. Ho\vever, his public defender persuaded him to plead guilty to a retail theft
charge. Another charge \Vas dismissed. Cesar \Vas not informed about the consequences
this guilty plea \Vould have on his immigration status. At the time of the entering of his
plea, Cesar was not informed of his rights under Rule 11 of the Utah Rules of Criminal
Procedure. Specifically, Cesar \Vas not informed of his right to counsel, his right to a
public trial, and his right to \Vithdraw his guilty plea.
All of the aforementioned facts are take directly from Cesar's Petition for Post
Conviction Relief. The Petition also states
The Statute of Limitations under U.C.A. §78B-9-107(e) is tolled because
Petitioner first became aware of the evidentiary facts on which the petition
is based within the past on year after reviewing his criminal proceedings
8
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with his new counsel. He would have raised the issues sooner, if not for the
ineffective assistance of his trial counsel. Petition at 1 11.
With these facts in mind, Cesar filed his Verified Petition for Relief Under the
Post Conviction Remedies Act (the PCRA Petition) on September 5, 2014. The trial
issued a commencment order on 11/10/2014, purusant to Rule 65C(i) of the Utah Rules
of Civil Procedure, ordering Ogden City to respond to the Petition. Ogden City filed a
Motion to Dismiss the Petition and accompanying memoranda on 12/10/2014. Cesar is
essentially alleging three issues in his Petition. First he is alleging that he was not
afforded his rights under Rule 11 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure. Because he
Vi

was not informed of certain constitutional rights his guilty plea was not entered
knowingly and voluntarily. Second, Cesar is alleging that he \Vas not apprised of the
effects this conviction may have on his immigration status, in violation of his due process
rights as outlined in the U.S. Supreme Court ruling in Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356
(2010). Third, Cesar alleged that the aforementioned errors primarily occurred because of
inneffective assistance of his trial counsel. Cesar alleges that he \Vould have petitioned
the court for post-conviction releif sooner, if not for ineffective assistance of his trial
counsel. As mentinoed supra the PCRA Petition alleges that the statute of limitations
outlined in U.C.A. §78B-9-107(2)(e) is tolled because Cesar first became aware of the
evidentiary facts on vvhich the petition is based within the past on year after reviewing his
criminal proceedings with his new counsel. Cesar ,vould have raised the issues sooner, if
not for the ineffective assistance of his trial counsel.

9
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The trial court granted Ogden City's motion to dismiss.i After reviwing exhibits
attached Ogden City's motion, the trial court found that the PCRA Petition was barred by
the limitations period outlined by Utah Code Ann. § 78B-9-107 (2)( e). The Court
specifically relied upon unverified "docket entries'' produced as attachments to the City's
motion to dismiss to determine that Cesar ;;should have kno\vn of the facts through the
exercise of reasonable diligence." Specifically, the trial court found that the ';official
docket entries represent instances where the Petitioner- through the exercise of diligent
efforts- should have knmvn of the potential impending immigration concerns that could
accompany his guilty plea.'' (See Order Dismissing Case on page 3, attached here\vith as
Addendum C). Essentially, the trial court relied upon minute entry notes in the unverified
docket sheets attached Ogden City's motion to determine that Cesar knew, or should have
knmvn through the exercise of reasonable diligence that there \Vould be negative
immigration consequences of his guilty plea.
SUNIMARY OF ARGUMENT
The trial court erred when it dismissed Cesar's Petition filed pursuant to the Post
Conviction Remedies Act C;PCRA"). Ogden City filed a motion, arguing that Cesar's
PCRA petition as time-barred because Cesar filed the petition more than two years after
his conviction. Ogden City attached a justice court minute entry sheet and referenced it in
its motion. The trial court ,vas persuaded by this document and held that Cesar's PCRA

i Ogden City alternatively argued that Cesar's petition was procedurally barred by U.C.A. § 788-9-106(c), but the
trial court did not address this issue in its ruling. Therefore, it is not an issue for appeal. Cesar's position was that he
would have raised the issues addressed in his petition through a trial de novo in District Court or through an appeal,
but for the ineffectiveness of his trial counsel. See U .C.A. § 788-9- 106(3).
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petition was time-barred because he -~should have knO\vn through reasonable diligence"
the facts upon \Vhich the petition is based.
The trial court erred because it did not treat the factual allegations in the PCRA
petition as true, with all reasonable inferences drawn from them in a light most favorable
to Cesar. Cesar properly pleaded his PCR.A. petition pursuant to Rule 65 of the Utah Rule
of Civil Procedure by alleging that he discovered,
~

\Vi thin

a year of filing his PCRA

petition, that his conviction caused him to suffer adverse immigration consequences.
Instead of evaluatin£
O£den Citv'
'., s motion in a li£ht favorable to Cesar, the trial court
"-"

~

relied on information a part from what \Vas properly pleaded.
The trial court committed reversible error by granting Ogden City's motion to
dismiss by relying on documents produced outside of the pleadings. As mentioned, the
trial court dismissed Cesar's case because it revie\ved information contained in what it
referred to as an ';official court docket sheet." The trial court did not convert Ogden
xP

City's motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment pursuant to Rule 12(b) of
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. By failing to do so, the trial court did not provide
Cesar meaningful notice of its intent to rely on outside documents and an opportunity to
provide documents of his own to contradict the ''official court docket sheet."
ARGUMENT
I.

THE TRJAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT DISMISSED CESAR'S CLAIM FOR
POST CONVICTION RELIEF ON THE GROUND THAT THE CESAR FILED
HIS CLAIMS AFTER THE EXPERIATION OF THE LIMITATIONS PERIOD
AS SET FORTH IN UTAH CODE ANN§ 78B-9-107(1) BECAUSE BEING
PRESENTED ANY EVIDENCE OF WHETHER THE TOLLING PROVISIONS
APPLY IN UTAH CODE ANN.§ 78B-9-107(2)(e) or§ 78B-9-107(3).

11
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The trial court erred by dismissing Cesar claims without hearing any evidence.
'When revie\ving a motion to dismiss. the Court must treat '·the factual allegations in the
~

,

~

complaint as true and consider them, and all reasonable inferences to be dravvn from
them, in a light most favorable to the plaintiff." St. Benedict's Dev. Co. v. St. Benedict's

Hosp., 811 P.2d 194, 196 (Utah 1991). The Court must then decide that, even if all of the
facts contained in the complaint are true, that the Plaintiff is still not entitled to the relief
it seeks. Id. ·while it is not stated as such, Ogden City's Motion is essentially a motion
filed pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure (Utah R. Civ. P.)
Rule 12(b)(6) states that a respondent can move to dismiss a case for'~ failure to state a
claim upon \Vhich relief can be granted." ·when reviewing a dismissal based on rule
12(b )(6) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, the court ';must accept the material
allegations in the petition as true, and \Viii affirm the dismissal only if the petitioner has
failed to state a claim for \Vhich relief can be granted, i.e., if he 'can prove no set of facts
in support of his claim.,~~ klcNair v. State, 2014 UT App 127,

~

6, 328 P.3d 874, 877

(Utah Ct. App. 2014) quoting Colman v. Utah State Land Bd., 795 P.2d 622,624 (Utah
1990).
The trial court held that Cesar~ s claims are time-barred because the petition was not
filed \Vi thin the statute of limitations period as outlined in U.C.A. § 78B-9-107(1 ). The
statute states .;a petitioner is entitled to relief only if the petition is filed \Vi thin one year
after the cause of action has accrued." Id. U.C.A. § 78B-9-107(2) defines when a cause of
action has ';accrued": For the purposes of this section, the cause of action accrues on the
latest of the following dates:
12
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(a) the last day for filing an appeal from the entry of the final judgment of
conviction, if no appeal is taken;
(b) the entry of the decision of the appellate court vvhich has jurisdiction
over the case, if an appeal is taken;
c) the last day for filing a petition for vvrit of certiorari in the Utah Supreme
Court or the United States Supreme Court, if no petition for vvrit of
certiorari is filed;
(d) the entry of the denial of the petition for writ of certiorari or the entry of
the decision on the petition for certiorari revie\v, if a petition for vvrit of
certiorari is filed;
(e) the date on which petitioner knew or should have known, in the exercise
of reasonable diligence, of evidentiary facts on \vhich the petition is based
Cesar alleged in his petition that he first became aware of the evidentiary facts upon
which the petition was based within a year of filing his Petition, vvhen he was haled in
front of immigration court for removal proceedings. Cesar has alleged that only then did
he discover that this conviction contained immigration consequences that were not
disclosed to him by his trial counsel and that only then did he discover the irregularities
of his conviction. Therefore based on the allegations of the Petition, the facts of vvhich
\Vere personally verified by the Petitioner, the one-year statute of limitations has not
expired, because Petitioner became m:vare of the evidentiary facts upon which his petition
is based within a year of filing his Petition, as subsection (e) anticipates.
Because Petitioner filed his petition \Vithin a year after he became mvare of the
evidentiary facts upon which his petition is based, he is well within the statute of
limitations as outlined in U.C.A. § 78B-9-l 07(2). As stated above, \vhen revie,ving a
motion to dismiss, the Court must treat "the factual allegations in the complaint as true
and consider them and all reasonable inferences to be drawn from them in a light most
favorable to the plaintiff." St. Benedict's Dev. Co. v. St. Benedict's Hosp., 811 P.2d 194,

13
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196 (Utah 1991 ). The Court must then decide that, ·"even if all of the facts contained in
the complaint are trne, that the Plaintiff is still not entitled to the relief it seeks." Id.
It is clear from the '"Ruling and Order on Respondent's Motion to Dismiss
Petitioner's Petition for Post Conviction Relief' that the trial court did not treat Cesar's
petition as if it \Vas trne and draw all reasonable inferences in his favor. The trial court
held that Cesar's petition was time-barred because, after reviewing a court minute entry
sheet, attached to Ogden City's moving papers, held that Cesar ··should have kno\vn, in
the exercise of reasonable diligence, of evidentiary facts on which the petition is based"
before he pleaded guilty to the retail theft charge. (See Page 3 of the Order) The trial
court surmised this after revie\ving the court minute entry sheet because the minute entry
sheet indicated that his '·parents had retained an immigration attorney on his behalf.~' Id.
The trial court based its entire decision on the notation entries of the justice court clerk
into the court docket.
The minute entry sheets presented by Ogden City, and relied upon by the trial
court, is belied by the allegations contained in Cesar's petition. Despite the notations in
the minute entry sheet relied upon by the trial court, Cesar claims that he was not advised
of the impact this guilty plea \Vould have on his immigration status. Cesar claims that his
trial counsel did not advise him properly and that he was haled into immigration court for
removal proceedings because of the misadvise. The United States Supreme Cou~ held:
We have long recognized that deportation is a particularly severe "penalty,"
Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 740, 13 S. Ct. 1016, 37 L.
Ed. 905 (1893); but it is not, in a strict sense, a criminal sanction. Although
removal proceedings are civil in nature, see INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468
U.S. 1032, 1038, 104 S. Ct. 3479, 82 L. Ed. 2d 778 (1984), deportation is
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nevertheless intimately related to the criminal process. Our law has
enmeshed criminal convictions and the penalty of deportation for nearly a
century, see Part I, supra, at 360-364, 176 L. Ed. 2d, at 290-293. And,
importantly, recent changes in our immigration law have made removal
nearly an automatic result for a broad class of noncitizen offenders. Thus,
we find it ''most difficult" to divorce the penalty from the conviction in the
deportation context. United States v. Russell, 686 F.2d 35, 38, 222 U.S.
App. D.C. 313 (CADC 1982). Moreover, we are quite confident that
noncitizen defendants facing a risk of deportation for a particular offense
find it even more difficult. See St. Cyr, 533 U.S., at 322, 121 S. Ct. 2271,
150 L. Ed. 2d 34 7 C·There can be little doubt that, as a general matter, alien
defendants considering whether to enter into a plea agreement are acutely
aware of the immigration consequences of their convictions"). Padilla v.
Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 365-366, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1481-1482 (U.S. 2010).
The Supreme Court ultimately concluded that, ''because the negotiation of a plea bargain
is a critical phase of litigation for purposes of the Sixth Amendment right to effective
assistance of counsel. Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 58, 106 S. Ct. 366, 88 L. Ed. 2d 203.
Pp. 369-374, 176 L. Ed. 2d, at 296-299. The severity of deportation-'the equivalent of
banishment or exile,' Delgadillo v. Carmichael, 332 U.S. 388, 390-391, 68 S. Ct. 10, 92

L. Ed. 17 ( 194 7) --only underscores how critical it is for counsel to inform her noncitizen
client that he faces a risk of deportation.''
Whether or not Cesar was properly advised by his trial counsel is an issue of
~

disputed fact in this case. The trial court relied on information contained in a minute entry
sheet, presumably prepared by a justice court clerk, without hearing Cesar's side of the
story. The trial court improperly dismissed Cesar's petition without first hearing
evidence, or at least allO\ving the parties to participate in discovery to determine what
Cesar knew, or didn't know ( or should have known) when he entered his guilty plea.
Cesar alleged that he was not advised about the immigration consequences of his guilty

15
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plea by his trial counsel. If this allegation is true, it is per se ineffective assistance of
counsel under Padilla's incorporation of the test outlined in Strickland v. Washington,
466 U.S. 668, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1984).
Cesar's Petition was plead in accordance with Rule 65C of the Utah R. Civ. P.,
\Vhich governs proceedings in all petitions for post-conviction relief. Rule 65C requires
that a petition contain, '~in plain and concise terms, all of the facts that form the basis of
the petitioner's claim to relief." Id. R. 65C(d)(3). This is a somewhat higher standard than
the general pleading standard found in rule 8(a). See Id. Rule S(a)(l) (requiring that
pleadings contain "a short and plain ... statement of the claim shmving that the party is
entitled to relief'). See 1vlcNair v. State, 2014 UT App 127 at ,I9. ·while Rule 65C no\v
mentions the possibility of a motion to dismiss as a responsive pleading (See Rule
65C(k)), it does not outline the appropriate standard of revie\V for such a motion.
Therefore, the only \Vay to evaluate Ogden City·'s motion is in the context of Rule
12(b)(6). This court held in klcNair .;Since rule 12(b)(6) does not conflict \Vith rnle 65C,
we assume all facts and reasonable inferences contained in the petition, as clarified in the
response to the State's motion to dismiss, in the light most favorable to McNair.'' 1vlcNair
v. State, 2014 UT App 127 at~ 17 (Utah Ct. App. 2014).

To grant a motion to dismiss, the court must treat '·must accept the material
allegations in the petition as true, and \Vill affirm the dismissal only if the petitioner has
failed to state a claim for which relief can be granted, i.e., if he ~ can prove no set of facts
in support of his claim."' klcNair 2014 UT App 127 at ii 6. Cesar has sufficiently laid out
a factual basis for his PCRA Petition and he should be afforded his opprotunity to
16
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prosecute his case.
II.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED \VHEN IT DISMISSED PETITIONER'S CLAIM
FOR POST CONVICTION RELIEF ON THE GROUND THAT THE CESAR
FILED HIS CLAIMS AFTER THE EXPERIATION OF THE LIMITATIONS
PERIOD AS SET FORTH IN UTAH CODE ANN§ 78B-9-107(1) BY REL YING
ON DOCillvfENTS OUTSIDE THE MOTION.
The trial court erred when it dismissed Cesar's PCRA petition by relying on

documents outside of the motion to dismiss. As argued supra the trial court heavily relied
~

upon documents attached to Ogden City's motion to dismiss. Ogden City attached, what
the trial court refers to as an '~official docket sheet." This sheet \Vas presented as an
attachment to Ogden City's motion without any explanation as to \Vhere it came from,
\Vho prepared it, or \vho entered the information it contained. The trial court relied upon
the information contained Ogden City's attachment to its moving papers. Such reliance
was improper and is reversible error, because the trial court failed to convert Ogden
City's motion into one for summary judgment. ;;If a court does not exclude material
outside the pleadings and fails to convert a rule l 2(b )( 6) motion to one for summary
judgment, it is reversible error unless the dismissal can be justified without considering
the outside documents." Tuttle v. Olds, 2007 UT App 10, P6, 155 P.3d 893, (Utah Ct.
App. 2007) quoting Oakwood Vil!., L.L.C. v. Albertsons,, 2004 UT 101, Pl2, 104 P.3d
1226 (Utah 2004 ). Rule 12(b) states:
If, on a motion asserting the defense numbered (6) to dismiss for failure of
the pleading to state a claim upon \vhich relief can be granted, matters
outside the pleading are presented to and not excluded by the court, the
motion shall be treated as one for summary judgment and disposed of as
provided in Rule 56, and all parties shall be given reasonable opportunity to
present all material made pertinent to such a motion by Rule 56.

17
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The trial court did not put Cesar on notice that it intended to treat Ogden City's motion as
a motion for summary judgment. Therefore, the motion \Vas not properly converted to a
Rule 56 motion for summary judgment and Cesar was not given a meaningful chance to
rebut the informtion contained in the docket sheet.

Tuttle v. Olds, 2007 UT App 10, 155 P.3d 893, (Utah Ct. App. 2007) is a case on
point and is instrnctive here. Tuttle involves a \Vater rights dispute between a landO\•Vner
(the Plaintiff) and the Utah State Engineer and Utah Department of Natural Resources
(the Defendants). The case involved a controversy from Defendants' discovery that
Plaintiffs vvere irrigating land \Vith more water than their certified \Vater rights permitted.
Defendants created a ground\vater management plan after a federal study revealed a
significant overdraft of vlater in the Valley. The ground\vater management plan called for
Defendants to conduct a survey comparing the actual irrigated acreage in the Valley with
the acreage that should be irrigated based on the \Vater rights of the Valley's farmers,
including Plaintiffs. Defendants sought to discover and stop any illegal watering in order
to restore the Valley's ground\vater to expected levels. The management plan included
procedures for notifying lando\vners of illegal \Vatering by letters warning recipients to
stop the illegal usage. This plaintiff did not receive a letter and did not think that their
\Vatering practices \Vere illegal. Plaintiffs later entered into a contract to sell the property
to a buyer. After purchasing the property, the buyer was informed that he did not have
rights to access the water to his land. The buyer sued the plaintiff in federal court. The
buyers sought damages for the decrease in the Property's value as a result of the inability
to legally irrigate the Property to the extent represented by Plaintiffs. The buyers
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eventually won a federal judgment against Plaintiffs for approximately$ 1,400,000.
~

Plaintiff then sued the defendant here (the state engineer). Without filing an answer to the
complaint, Defendants filed a motion to dismiss Plaintiffs' claims pursuant to rule
12(b)(6) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. The trial court granted the motion to
dismiss, relying heavily on the federal judgment obtained against the plaintiff in their
federal lavvsuit with the buyer of their land. The court of appeals reversed the trial court's
decision because it relied on documents outside the pleadings when rendering judgment.
The rnle 12(b) conversion procedure consists of ';giving the parties reasonable
notice and opportunity to submit all pertinent summary judgment materials for the court's
consideration.'~ Id. at~ 8 See also Hebertson v. Willowcreek Plaza, 923 P.2d 1389, 1391
(Utah 1996); Strand v. Associated Students of Univ. of Utah, 561 P .2d 191, 193 (Utah
1977). ~;The notice and opportunity to submit requirements are especially important \Vith
respect to the party against whom judgment is entered." See Strand, 561 P.2d at 193

~

(stating that the opportunity for the non-moving party to submit rule 56 material is
particularly important). The Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provide that complaints and
ans\vers constitute pleadings. See Utah R. Civ. P. 7(a) (including replies to counterclaims
and ans\vers to cross-claims, as well as third-party complaints and answers, within the
definition of pleadings). A matter outside the pleadings '~include[s] any written or oral
evidence ... vvhich ... substantiat[ es] ... and does not merely reiterate what is said in
the pleadings." Oakwood Vil!., 2004 UT 101 at it 12.
The trial court here did not give Cesar an adequate opportunity to present
information outside of the pleadings to respond to the minute entry sheet produced by
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Ogden City. The minute entry sheet did not simply reiterate what was said in any
pleading before the trial court. Granting of the motion, based on the information in this
document, was improper and the matter should be reversed.
Nevertheless, even if the trial court had converted Ogden City's motion to a
motion for summary judgment, the document would still be problematic and likely
inadmissible. The document would not be sufficient as a supportive document for a
motion for summary judgment under Utah R. Civ. P. Rule 56. Rule 56(f) vvould require
such a document supplied by Ogden City to:
be made on personal knovvledge, shall set forth such facts as would be
admissible in evidence, and shall show affirmatively that the affiant is
competent to testify to the matters stated therein. Svvom or certified copies
of all papers or parts thereof referred to in an affidavit shall be attached
thereto or served therewith.
The minute entry sheet vvas not verified by any person nor vvas it certified by a court
clerk, or any other court employee entrusted vvith verifying court papers. Therefore, even
if presented- it \Vould not be admissible for a summary judgment motion.
The trial court relied heavily on the minute entry sheet that it referred to as an
'~official docket sheet'~ in its ruling. Because it relied on information presented outside of
the pleadings, the trial court's decision to dismiss Cesar's case should be overturned and
remanded so that Cesar be afforded his day in court.

CONCLUSION
The trial court erred by granting Ogden City's motion to dismiss. The trial court
did not "accept the material allegations in the petition as true." The trial court was
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required to accept the allegations at face value, and only dismiss the claim if the
~

allegations could prove no set of facts in support of his claim. Cesar has sufficiently laid
out a factual basis for his PCRA Petition to survive a motion to dismiss. This court
should examine the dismissal in the same framevvork as any motion filed pursuant to Rule
12(b)(6), because it does not contradict Rule 65C. \Vhen vie\ved in a light most favorable
to the petition, the trial court should not have dismissed the petition.
Furthermore, the trial court commited reversible error by relying on documents
outside the pleadings when rendering a decision. The trial court failed to convert Ogden
City's motion to a summary judgment motion as required by Rule 12(b). The trial court
relied heavily on the minute entry sheet produced by Ogden City and by failing to
provide Cesar proper notice and a meaningful oppomtnity to offer evidence to contradict
the statements in the minute entry sheet, the trial court commited reversible error.

DATED this 21 st day of July 2015.
RlCHARDS LAW GROUP, P.C.

J ~
Aµomey for Appellant
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1. This brief complies with the type-volume limitation of Utah R. App. P .24(t)( 1)
because this brief contains 5,288 words, excluding the parts of the brief exempted by
Utah R. App. P.24(t")(l)(B).
2. This brief complies with the typeface requirements of Utah R. App. P.27(b) because:
G this brief has been prepared in a proportionally spaced typeface using
Microsoft \Vord in 13 point roman style.

DATED this 21 st day of July 2015.
RICHARDS LA \V GROUP, P.C.

~omey for Appellant

22

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

PROOF OF SERVICE
I certify that on 0712112015 I served a true and correct copy of the foregoing
BRIEF OF APPELLANT to:
Utah Court of Appeals
PO Box 140230
Salt Lake City, UT 84114-0230
(Via First Class Mail)

\Vm. Gregory Burdett
310 26th Street
Ogden. UT 84401
(Via First Class Mail)

23

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

ADDENDA
Addendum One: Petition for Post Conviction Relief
Addendum Two: Motion to Dismiss and supporting Memorandum
Addendum Three: Ruling and Order on Respondent's Motion to Dismiss Petitioner's
Petition for Post Conviction Relief.

@

24
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

ADDENDUM A

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Jason B. Richards #13341
RICHARDS LA\V GROUP, P.C.
2568 Washington Blvd. Suite 102
Ogden, Utah 84401
Telephone: (801) 781-2026
Facsimile: (801) 334-9662
Email: jason@jbrlawyers.com

Attorneys for Petitioner
IJ.~ THE SECOND DISTRICT COURT It~ AND FOR
'WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
~

CESAR DANIEL LOPEZ

)

Petitioner,

)

vs.

VERIFIED PETITION FOR
RELIEF UNDER THE POST
CO~VICTION RElVIEDIES ACT
~

)

OGDEN CITY
Respondent.

)

Case No.

)

Judge:
~

Cesar Daniel Lopez ("Petitione(' or "Cesar'1 by and through counsel undersigned, and
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §§ 78B-9-104, 78B-9-107(3) and 78B-9-401,.hereby petitions this
court for an order granting relief under the Post Conviction Remedies Act.
NATURE OF THE CASE
1. This Petition seeks to vacate the conviction entered by the Ogden Justice Court on
01/21/2011.
2. Petitioner maintains that his conviction was entered in violation of his rights under the
United States and Utah Constitution.
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PARTIES, JURISDICTION, AND VE~'TIE

3. The Petitioner was convicted of Retail Theft, a Class B Misdemeanor on January 28,
2011 in the Ogden Justice Court in Weber County (See Case No. 101803862).
4. At the time of the conviction, Petitioner was a resident of Weber County, Utah.
5. The Respondent, Ogden City, initiated and prosecuted the criminal charge at issue against
the Petitioner, by filing a citation with the Ogden City Justice Court in Weber County,
State of Utah.
6. The Petitioner is not presently incarcerated, his judgment was not reviewed on appeal,

and the legality of his conviction or sentence was not adjudicated previously in either a
civil or post-conviction proceeding.
7. Petitioner did not directly appeal his judgment, conviction and sentence previously

because he alleges that he first became aware of the evidentiary facts on which the
petition is based on within the last one year of this Petition. Therefore, this was well after
the time limits for those methods of relief had expired.
8. Cesar would have petitioned the court for post-conviction releif sooner, if not for
ineffective assistance of his trial counsel.
9. This Court has jurisdiction over this Petition for Post-Conviction Relief pursuant to

U.C.A. §78B-9-104(1).
10. Venue is proper in this Court pursuant to U.C.A. §78B-3-307.
11. The Statute of Limitations under U.C.A. §78B-9-107(e) is tolled because Petitioner first
became aware of the evidentiary facts on which the petition is based within the past on
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year after reviewing his criminal proceedings with his new counsel. He would have raised
the issues sooner, if not for the ineffective assistance of his trial counsel.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
12. Cesar was charged by way oflnformation on 11/20/2010. He was arrested and taken to
jail shortly after the alleged offense purportedly took place.
13. Cesar was brought before the justice court judge via video court the next morning. The
public defender entered as counsel and scheduled a pre-trial conference.
14. On or about 12/02/2010 Cesar had a pre-trial conference and was transported from the
jail to his court appearance.
15. He was again transported to the justice court for a pre-trial conference on 12/09/2010.
16. On or about O1/29/2011 Cesar was transported to the jail fully intending on have a trial
on his theft charge. Ho\.vever, his public defender pursuaded him to plead guilty to a retail
theft charge. Another charge was dismissed.
17. Cesar was not informed about the consequences this guilty plea would have on his
immigration status.
18. At the time of the entering of his plea, Jorge was not informed of his rights under Rule 11
of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure.
19. Specifically, Cesar was not informed of his right to counsel, his right to a public trial, and
his right to withdraw his guilty plea.
GROUNDS FOR RELIEF
CONSTITUTIOI\AL CLAIMS
20. Cesar repeats and incorporates by reference allegations 1- I 8 of this Verified Petition.

3
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C&.·

21. The failure of Cesa{' s public defender to apprise him of the possible immigration

consequences of his guilty was a violation of Cesar's constitutional rights.
22. The failure of his public defender or the Justice Court to apprise Cesar of his

constitutional rights to counsel, a trial, and other rights listed under Rule 11 constitutes a
violation of the Fifth, Sixth, and 14 th Amendments to the United States Constitution.
23. Furthermore, the failure of the Justice Court to apprise Cesar of his constitutional rights
as outlined above constitute a violation of Article I, Sections 7 and 12 of the Utah
Constitution.
WHEREFORE, Petitioner Cesar Lopez, petitions this Court to vacate the conviction
\id)

entered by the Ogden Justice Court in the aforementioned case and dismiss the charges against
him.
DATED this 4th day of September 2014.
RICHARDS LAW GROUP, P.C.

Isl Jason B. Richards
JASON B. RICHARDS
Attorney for Petitioner
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VERIFICATION
CESARY DANIEL LOPEZ, being first duly sworn deposes and states that he is the
Petitioner in the above entitled action~ that he read the foregoing Verified Petition, that he
understands its contents; and that the facts set forth in this pleading are true ancl correct to his
ovvn personal knowledge, or belief where indicated.

DATED this 5 day of September 2014

Isl Cesar Daniel Lopez
CESAR DANIEL LOPEZ
Petitioner

SWORi"\T AND SUBSCRIBED to before me this 5 day of September 2014.

Isl Ashley Allen
Ashley Allen
Notary Public-State of Utah
Commission No. 604117
Comm. Exp. 12-16-2014
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Michael S. Junk, #5095
Wm. Gregory Burdett, #7825
Ogden City Prosecutor's Office
310 - 26 th Street
Ogden, UT 84401
Tel:
(801) 629-8595

IN THE SECOND DISTRICT COURT
,VEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
CESA.R D.A.1"\/!EL LOPEZ:

l\:IElVIORt.\.i"'""DUM SUPPORTING
l\i!OTION TO DISJVIISS PETITI01'
FOR POST-COiVVICTION RELIEF

Petitioner,
V.

Case No. 140905670
OGDEN CITY,
Judge Ernie \V. Jones
Respondent.
Ogden City, by and through the undersigned attorney, submits this Memorandum
Supporting Motion to Dismiss Petition for Post-Conviction Relief.

FACTS

1.

This case ,vas initiated on November 22, 2010, charging Cesar Daniel Lopez

(hereinafter referred to as the ··Petitioner") with tvvo misdemeanor counts: Unla\vful Possession
or Consumption of Alcohol by Minor, a class B misdemeanor, and Retail Theft, a class B
misdemeanor. See Ogden City Justice Court Docket for Case# 101803862 hereto as Exhibit A.
2.

On November 22, 2010, Petitioner ,vas arraigned upon the aforementioned

charges. The court appointed the public defender for the Petitioner. A Pretrial Conference was
scheduled for December 2, 2010. See Exhibit A.
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3.

On December 2, 2010, defense counsel moved to continue the pretrial conference

to another day. The case was continued to December 9, 2010, for an additional pretrial
conference. See Exhibit A.
4.

On December 9, 2010, a bench trial vvas scheduled for January 28, 2011. See

Exhibit A.
5.

On January 28, 2011, Petitioner, being represented by counsel, entered into a plea

negotiation in which he pled guilty to the class B misdemeanor, Retail Theft, and the remaining
charge was dismissed. See Exhibit A.
6.

vi

The Petitioner was sentenced to a term of 60 days or he could pay $500 fine. The

court ordered that his sentence could run concurrent vvith any other time the defendant is serving
and that the Petitioner could be released to Immigration. See Exhibit A.
7.

Petitioner failed to file a Notice of Appeal with the Ogden City Justice Court. No

entry of such a filing is listed on the court docket. See Exhibit A.
8.

Petitioner through his counsel filed a petition for Post-Conviction Relief on or

about September 5, 2014.

ARGU1\1ENT

I.

PETITI01'1ER'S PETITION FOR POST-CONVICTION RELIEF IS
PROCEDURALLY BARRED BECAUSE PETITIONER FAILED TO SEEK A
TRIAL DE NOVO.
The Post-Conviction Remedies Act contains two provisions that significantly limit a

petitioner's right to seek post-conviction relief. First section 78B-9-106 precludes a petitioner
from ·receiving relief if the ground for relief could have been but was not raised at trial or on

Lopez v. Ogden City
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appeal. Utah Code Ann. § 78B-9-106 (2008). Seco~d to be eligible for post-conviction relief, the
petitioner must have "exhausted all other legal remedies, including a direct appeal." Id § 78B-9l 02. A petition for post-conviction relief is a collateral attack on a conviction and sentence and
is not a substitute for direct appellate review. Rudolph v. Galetka, 2002 UT 7,, 5, 43 P.3d 467.
To be eligible for post-conviction relief, petitioners have consistently been required to appeal
errors through regular and prescribed procedures in order to prevent e:x.-traordinary relief from
being used as a substitute for normal appellate procedures. Lucero v. Kennard, 2005 UT 79,

~

36,

125 P.3d 917. The regular and prescribed method for appealing a justice court conviction is to
seek a trial de novo in the district court. Id.

f 38 and Utah Code Ann.§ 78A-7-118.

Thus, the critical inquiry to determine whether a justice court defendant must seek a de
novo trial in order to meet the exhaustion requirement and be eligible for post-conviction relief is
this: could a trial de novo provide the justice court defendant vvith a plain, speedy, and adequate
remedy for the alleged constitutional :violation? Lucero, 2005 UT 79, at, 38. In other words,
where an appropriate remedy for a constitutional violation would be a nevv trial, a justice court
defendant must undergo a trial de nova to meet the exhaustion requirement. Id. Furthermore, to
obtain post-conviction relief if a justice court defendant has not sought a trial de novo, the
defendant must establish that the constitutional violation was the kind that would demand relief
beyond a new trial. Id.
In our case, petitioner failed to seek a trial de novo. He was convicted and sentenced on
August 31, 2012. He was informed-by the court that he had 30 days to appeal any sentence
given. He did not file a notice to appeal within the 30 days of sentencing. Therefore, petitioner
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pursuant to Section 78B-9-106 of the Utah Code Annotated is procedurally barred from seeking
post-conviction relief because he did not exhaust his legal remedies.

PETITI01""ER'S PETITION FOR POST-CONVICTION RELIEF IS
PROCEDURALLY BARRED BECAUSE PETITIONER FAILED TO FILE
\YITHIN" THE STATUTE OF LTh'.IIATIONS.

II.

Utah's Post-Conviction Remedies Act (PCRA) contains a one· year statute of limitations.
Under the PCRA., a ''petitioner is entitled to relief only if the petition is filed ¥.r:ithin one year
after thecause of action has accrued." Utah Code Ann. §78B-9-107(1). For purposes of the
PCRA, a cause of action accrues on the latest of the follmving dates:
(a) the last day for filing an appeal from the entry of the final
judgment of conviction, if no appeal is taken;

***

(e) the date on which petitioner knew or should have known, in the
exercise of reasonable diligence, of evidentiary facts on which the
petition is based;
Utah Code Ann. §78B-9-107(2). 1
Petitioner did not file any direct appeal. Therefore, his cause of action accrued on ~'the
last day for filing an appeal from the entry of the final judgment of conviction, if no appeal is
taken." Utah Code Ann. §78B-9-107(2) (a). Petitioner was sentenced on January 28, 2011.
After a criminal conviction in a justice court, a notice of appeal "must be filed vvithin 30 days of
the entry of that order or judgment." Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure 38(b) (1). Petitioner .
therefore had until February 28, 2011, in which to file a notice of appeal. Since he did not file

1

A cause of action may also accrue on the date of entry of the decision of the appellate court, the last day for
filing a certiorari petition, or entry of denial of certiorari or entry of the decision on certior?Ui review, or the date on
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any appeal, his post-conviction cause of action accrued on that date and he had one year in which
to file a post-conviction petition. In other words, a timely post-conviction petition had to be filed
on or before February 28, 2012. Petitioner did not file his post-conviction petition until
September 5, 2014. His petition is over two years t_oo late.
The PCRA one year ''limitations period is tolled for any p·eriod during which the
petitioner was prevented from filing a petition due to state action in violation of the United States
Constitution, or due to physical or mental incapacity. The· petitioner has the burden of proving
by a preponderance of the evidence that the petitioner is entitled to relief under this Subsection
(3)." Utah Code Ann. § 78B-9-107(3). Petitioner has not asserted that he is entitled to tolling
under this provision.
Because respondent has asserted that petitioner's claims are time-barred, petitioner has
the burden to disprove that his petition is time-barred. ''The respondent has the burden of ·
pleading any ground of preclusion ... but once a ground has been pled, the petitioner has the
burden to disprove its existence by a preponderance of the evidence." Utah Code Ann. § 78B-9105.

CONCLUSION
Petitioner is both time and procedurally barred from seeking post-conviction relief
because he failed to exhaust bis legal remedy by not filing a notice of appeal with the court for a
trial de novo and by not filing his petition for post-conviction relief before the one year statute of
limitations. Based on the facts, the law, and the arguments set forth above, respondent

which a new rule as described in subsection 78B-9-104(1)(t) is established. None of these dates apply to Petitioner
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respectfully request that this Court to deny and dismiss the petition for post-conviction relied
\JI

filed by Petitioner.
Dated this / l> day of

O~e..,_, ~,--, 2014.

~-'ffJ£lc-Ogden City Prosecu'efr

CERTIFICATE OF NIAILING

vj

r.iJJ

I hereby certify that on the lQ_ day of {)~·~ar 2014, I served a true and
correct copy of the foregoing NIEMORAL"'IDUM SUPPORTING MOTION TO DISMISS
PETITION FOR POST-CON--VICTION RELIEF, on the following individuals by filing the
document vvith the court through electronic filing:

Jason B. Richards
Attorney for Petitioner

I

:

because he did not appeal and no new rule is applicable.
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OGDEN CITY JUSTICE COURT
\VEBER COU}rrY, STATE OF UTAH
OGDEN CITY vs. CESAR DANIEL LOPEZ
CASE NUMBER 101803 862 Other Misdemeanor

CHARGES
Charge 1 - 32A-12-209 - UNLAWFUL POSSESSION OR CONSUi\{PTION OF
ALCOHOL BY JVIINOR Class B Misdemeanor
Offense Date: November 21, 2010
Plea: November 22, 2010 Not Guilty
Disposition: January 28, 2011 Dismissed (w/o prej)
Charge 2 - 76-6-602 -RETAIL THEFT (SHOPLIFTfr,m) Class B
1fisdemeanor
Offense Date: November 21, 2010
Plea: January 28, 2011 Guilty
Disposition: January 28, 2011 {Guilty}

CC.JR.RENT ASSIG°N"ED n.JDGE
NOR.J.\1AN L ASHTON
PARTIES
Defendant - CESAR DA~lEL LOPEZ
Represented by: CITY PDA
Plaintiff - OGDEN CITY
DEFENDANT INFO&.vIATION
Defendant Name: CESAR DA.~1EL LOPEZ
Offense tracking number: 15111404
Date of Birth: January 07, 1991
Law Enforcement Agency: OGDEN CITY POLICE
Prosecuting Agency: OGDEN CITY
ACCOUNT S111flvfARY
TOTAL REVE1'.TLTE Amount Due:
Amount Paid:
5.50
0.00
Credit:
Balance:
0.00

5.50

REVE:t--.11.JE DETAIL-TYPE: CERTIFIED COPIES
Amount Due:
0.50
0.§0
Amount Paid:
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Amount Credit:
Balance:

0.00

0.00

REVENUE DETAIL -TYPE: COPY FEE

Amount Due:

1.00

Amount Paid:
Amount Credit:
Balance:

1.00
0.00

0.00

REVENUE DETAIL-TYPE: CERTITICATION
Amount Due:
4.00
Amount Paid:
4.00
Amount Credit:
0.00
Balance:
0.00
PROCEEDINGS
11-22-10 Case filed
11-22-10 Filed: From an Information
11-22-10 Judge Ai~REA LOCKWOOD assigned.
11-22-10 Filed: Information
11-22-10 Judge NOR.ivLA..!'-4 L ASHTON assigned.
11-22-10 Minute Entry - Minutes for Appointment of Counsel
Judge: NOR.lvL.:\..N L ASHTON

PRESENT
Clerk: lidiad
Prosecutor: WEISKOPF, DAVIDE
Defendant
Defendant's Attorr.ey(s): VALLEJO, !Ai~ R
Video
ARR.AI Gl\r.IENT
Defendant i,vaives reading of Information.
Advised of rights and penalties.
The defendant is advised of right to counsel.
Defendant is arraigned.
Tbis is the ti.me set for video arraignment. PDA enters as counsel.
Defendant enters pleas of not guilty to the charges as filed.
Pre-Trial set for 12/02/10. S1146 bail stands. Defendant has ICE
hold.
APPOINTi\tIENT OF COUNSEL

Court finds the defendant indigent and appoints CITY PDA to
represent the defendant.
Appointed Counsel:
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CASE NillvIBER 101803862 Other Misdemeanor

Name: CITY PDA
Address:
City: OGDEN UT 84401
Phone:
PRE-TRIAL CONFERENCE is scheduled.
Date: 12/02/2010
Time: 10:00 a.m.
Location: N arm.an L. Ashton
310 - 26th Street
Ogden, UT 84401
Before Judge: NORJ.vI.Au'T L ASHTON
11-22-10 PRE-TRIAL CONFERENCE scheduled on December 02, 2010 at 10:00 A.!\1
in Norman L. Ashton with Judge ASHTON.
11-22-10 Charge 1 Plea is Not Guilty
11-22-10 Charge 2 Plea is Not Guilty
12-02-10 ivfinute Entry- Pretrial Conference continued
Judge: NO&v1AJ.'T L ASHTON
PRESENT
Clerk: tiannam
Prosecutor: BURDETT, W GREGORY
Defendant
Defendant's Attomey(s): STUDEBAKER, ivITCHAEL P

CONTINU.Au.'\iCE
'Whose Motion:
The Defendant's counsel CITY PDA.
Reason for continuance:
Defendant's parents have retained an immigration attorney.
Case continued to 12/9/10 at 10:30 a.m.
The motion is granted.
PRE-TRIAL CONFERENCE is scheduled.
Date: 12/09/2010
Time: 10:30 a.m.
Location: Norman L. Ashton
310 - 26th Street
Ogden, lJT 84401
Before Judge: NORJ.vLA.N L ASHTON
12-02-10 PRE-TRIAL CONFERENCE Continued.
12-02-10 PRE-TRIAL CO~lf'ERENCE scheduled on December 09, 2010 at 10:30 A11
in Norman L. Ashton \vith Judge ASHTON.
12-09-10 Minute Entry - Minutes for PRE-TRIAL CO011FERENCE
Judge: NORM;\..'N' L ASHTON
PRESENT
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CASE NUMBER 101803862 Other Misdemeanor

Clerk: pamr
Prosecutor: BURDETT, W GREGORY
Defendant
Defendant's Attomey(s): STIJDEBAKER, NfICHAEL P

HEARJN'G

This is the time set for pr_e-trial conference. Defendant is
present in custody of Weber County Jail \vith PDA as counsel.
Negotiations have not been reached. Bench trial is set 1/28/11 at
10:30 a.m. Bail remains set at S1146. Defendant also has bice hold.
BENCH TRIAL is scheduled.
Date: 01/28/2011
Time: 10:30 a.m.
Location: Norman L. Ashton
310 - 26th Street
Ogden, lJT 84401
Before Judge: NORLvLl\.i'{ L ASHTON
12-09-10 BENCH TRIAL scheduled on January 28, 2011 at 10:30 .1\.1\f in Norman
L. Ashton with Judge ASHTON.
01-28-11 Minute Entry-Minutes for BENCH TRIAL
Judge: NOR.iv1AN L ASHTON
PRESENT
Clerk: pamr
Prosecutor: BlJR.DETT, W GREGORY
Defendant
Defendant pro se
Defendant's Attomey(s): N°"EBEKER, r.;1A.TTHE\V L
Interpreter: Angelica Shaefer (Spanish)
Language: Spanish
HEARING
This is the time set for bench trial. Defendant is present, in
custody of Weber County Jail, \vith PDA as counsel. Trial is not
held as negotiations have been reached.
Defendant enters plea of guilty to NIB-retail theft. City moves to
dismiss remaining charges.
Court accepts and proceeds ,vith sentencing.
SENTENCE JAIL
Based on the defendant's conviction of REIAIL THEFT (SHOPLIFTING) a
Class B Misdemeanor, the defendant is sentenced to a term of 60
day(s) The total time suspended f9r this charge is 60 day(s).
SENTENCE JAIL SERVICE NOTE
Court imposes a pay/stay sentence of $500 cash or 60 days jail.
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Sentence may run concurrent ~itb any other time the defendant is
serving. Defendant may be released to Immigrations.
SENTENCE FIN"E
Charge# 2
Fine: $500.00
Suspended: $0.00
Surcharge: $257.89
Due: S500.00

··

Total Fine: $500.00
Total Suspended: $0
Total Surcharge: $257.89
Total Principal Due: $500.00
Plus Interest
01-28-11 Charge 1 Disposition is Dismissed
01-28-11 Charge 2 Disposition is {Guilty}
01-28-11 Case Closed
Disposition Judge is NORivfAi"\i L ASHTON
01-31-11 Filed order: Sentence, Judgment, Commitment
Judge NORiv!AN L ASHTON
Signed Januazy 31, 2011
03-29-11 Fee Account created
Total Due:
0.50
03-29-11 Fee Account created
Total Due:
1.00
03-29-11 Fee Account created
Total Due:
4.00
03-29-11 CERTIFIED COPIES
Payment Received:
0.50
Note: 10.50 cash tendered.
5.00 change given.
03-29-11 COPY FEE
Payment Received:
1.00
03-29-11 CERTIFICATION
Payment Recejved:
4.00
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FILED
MARO 9 2015
SECOND

IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT C
,P ISTRl~T COURT
IN AND FOR WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

CESAR DANIEL LOPEZ,
Petitioner,
vs.

RULING AND ORDER
ON RESPONDENT'S
MOTION TO DISMISS
PETITIONER'S
PETITION FOR POSTCONVICTION RELEIF

OGDEN CITY,
Respondent.
Case No. 140905670
Judge Ernie W. Jones

This matter is before the Court on Respondent's Motion to Dismiss
Petitioner's Petition for Relief Under the Post Conviction Remedies Act.
The Court, subsequent to initial review, previously forwarded a copy of the
Petitioner's Verified Petition to Respondent for response. The Court has
received Respondent's Motion to Dismiss the Petition and supporting
memorandum as well as Petitioner's memorandum opposing that dismissal
motion. Having reviewed the now complete briefing on this matter, the
Court is prepared to make the following ruling.
On January 28, 2011, Petitioner pied guilty to a single count of Class
B Misdemeanor Retail Theft in the Ogden City Justice Court. At some point
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in 2014, Petitioner was haled before an immigration court for removal
proceedings that were instigated as a result of his previous guilty plea.
Central to Petitioner argument for post-conviction relief is the argument that
he was unaware of the adverse consequences that his guilty plea could have
on his immigration status. Petitioner maintains that his appointed public
defender offered ineffective assistance in failing to inform the Petitioner of
these possible consequences. Related to this argument, Petitioner also offers
that the Ogden City Justice Court neglected to inform him of his right to a
public trial and his right to withdraw his guilty plea in addition to the
possibility of adverse immigration consequences as a result of his guilty
plea.
While Petitioner's claims are grounded in an appropriate basis
pursuant to Utah Code §78B-9-104 and are not subject to preclusion under
Utah Code §78B-9-106, the Court determines here that Petitioner has
brought his claims long after the expiration of the limitations period
established in Utah Code §78B-9-107. Specifically, the Court determines
that the limitations period outlined in Utah Code §78B-9-107(2)(e) began to
run during Petitioner's misdemeanor proceedings before the Ogden City
Justice Court or, at the latest, immediately following his sentencing and not
within the last year when Petitioner began contending removal proceedings.
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Utah Code §78B-9-107(2)(e) sets forth that a Petitioner must file his
petition within one year after "the date on which petitioner knew or should
have known, in the exercise of reasonable diligence, of evidentiary facts on
which the petition is based." The Court notes here that the limitations period

does not begin to run as soon as Petitioner affirmatively knows of the
evidentiary facts fanning the basis of his petition, but rather when the
Petitioner "should have known" of those facts through the exercise of
"reasonable diligence." Pursuant to the Ogden City Justice Court Docket
regarding Petitioner's misdemeanor proceedings, Petitioner was granted a
continuance on December 2, 2010 due to the fact that his Parents retained an
immigration attorney on his behalf. Resp't Br. Ex. A at 3. Furthermore, the
Justice Court informed the Petitioner at his sentencing that he might be
released to immigration. Resp't Br. Ex. A at 5.
The Court determines that these official docket entries represent
instances where the Petitioner-through the exercise of diligent effortsshould have known of the potential of impending immigration concerns that
could accompany his guilty plea. As he stood to know of these potential
consequences, it follows that the exercise of reasonable diligence would
have alerted him at that time of the procedural mechanisms to appeal his
sentence to the District Court through a trial de novo. As such, the Court
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determines that the time for an appropriate filing of a Post-Conviction
Petition has long since passed since the cause of action began to accrue soon
after the imposition of Petitioner's sentence. The filing of this petition in
2014, nearly two years after the limitations period expired, is therefore
untimely and the Court cannot grant the requested relief.
The Court therefore GRANTS Respondent's Motion to Dismiss the
Petition for Post-Conviction Relief. In accordance with the aforementioned
ruling, Petitioner's Petition for Post-Conviction Relief is DISN15SED. This
represents the final order of the Court. Not further order is required pursuant
to Rule 7(f) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
Dated this _J_ day of March 2015.

~esy,
District Court Judge

\
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that on the_!}__ day o f ~ 2015, I sent a true and
correct copy of the foregoing ruling and order to Peti~ione: and Respondent as follows:
Jason B. Richards
Attorney for Petitioner
Richards Law Group, P .C.,
2568 Washington Blvd. Suite 102
Ogden, Utah 84401
Ogden City Prosecutor's Office
Attorneys for Respondent Ogden City
310 26th Street
Ogden, Utah 84401
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